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DONOR UNKNOWN: ASSESSING THE
SECTION 15 RIGHTS OF DONORCONCEIVED OFFSPRING*
Vanessa Gruben**
Daphne Gilbert***
INTRODUCTION
A number of donor-conceived offspring have expressed a need
to know their genetic origins, but do they have a
constitutionally protected right to know the identity of their
biological progenitor? Several factors have triggered these
rights claims and have re-invigorated the debate over whether
egg and sperm donors should remain anonymous.1 First, there
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1

This paper focuses on anonymous sperm donation, which has been
better studied than ova donation for several reasons. Sperm donation
is much more common in Canada than ova donation, although
individuals are using donated ova more frequently: S Purewal &
OBA van den Akker, “Systematic Review of Oocyte Donation:
Investigating Attitudes, Motivations and Experiences” (2009) 15
Human Reproductive Update 499. This may be due in part to the fact
that these donation processes are distinct. Unlike sperm donation,
donating ova is physically intrusive and carries with it serious risks
such as ovarian hyperstimulation. As a result, ova shortages are far
greater than sperm shortages. This appears to be the case in the
United Kingdom: Ilke Turkmendag et al, “The Removal of Donor
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has been a shift to greater openness in the context of adoption,
prompting many to ask whether a similar shift is warranted in
the context of assisted human reproductive technologies
(ARTs).2 Second, there is an increased emphasis on one’s
family medical history and genetic information in the
prevention and treatment of disease. Third, some countries
have recently abolished donor anonymity including the United
Kingdom,3 Sweden,4 the Netherlands,5 New Zealand and a
couple of states in Australia.6 Finally, a number of donorconceived offspring are expressing a desire to learn more about
their donors, including the donor’s identity. This quest for
information has prompted some donor-conceived offspring to
take action. Many have enrolled in donor registries, like the
Donor Sibling Registry, where they hope to find their half-

Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of Claims by Would-be
Parents” (2008) 22 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 283 at 297.
2

Vital Statistics Act, RSO 1990, c V.4; Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5.
For a discussion of the movement towards greater openness, see
Cindy Baldassi, “The Quest to Access Closed Adoption Files in
Canada: Understanding Social Context and Legal Resistance to
Change” (2005) 21 Can J Fam L 211.

3

Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, c 37. See generally
Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith, “Donor Conceived People’s Access to
Genetic and Biographical History: An Analysis of Provisions in
Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor Identity”
(2009) 23 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 174.

4

Swedish Law on Artificial Insemination 1985, no 1140/l984. See also
Ken Daniels, “The Swedish Insemination Act and Its Impact” (1994)
34 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and
Gynaecology 437.

5

PMW Janssens et al “A New Dutch Law Regulating Provision of
Identifying Information of Donors to Offspring: Background, Content
and Impact” (2006) 21:4 Human Reproduction 852.

6

Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA).
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siblings or donors.7 Others, like Olivia Pratten, have turned to
the courts in the hopes of bringing about legal reform in this
area.8
This paper explores the rights claims of donor
offspring pursuant to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (the Charter).9 In the first part, we
describe the history of donor anonymity in Canada. In Part II,
we describe the legal challenge to donor anonymity brought by
Olivia Pratten. In Part III, we consider the equality dimensions
to a constitutional claim against British Columbia’s Adoption
Act under section 15 of the Charter. In our view, Justice
Adair’s analysis misses the mark in several respects: her
comparison of adoptees and donor offspring warrants more
careful consideration; she was too quick to accept the manner
of conception as an analogous ground while failing to consider
the more appropriate ground of family status; and, her focus on
whether the dignity of donor offspring has been violated as
opposed to whether they have suffered prejudice, stereotyping
or disadvantage was misplaced. We believe that it may be
possible for donor offspring to address these shortcomings and
we offer suggestions as to how to do so throughout. Assuming
a violation of section 15 exists, in the fourth part, we discuss
why the government will be hard pressed to establish that the
limit on donor conceived offspring’s rights is a reasonable limit
7

The Donor Sibling Registry, online: The Donor Sibling Registry
<http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com>.

8

Olivia Pratten v Attorney General of British Columbia and College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2011 BCSC 656, 235 CRR (2d)
118 [Pratten]. Pratten (Statement of claim) online: Arvay Finlay
Barristers
<http://www.arvayfinlay.com/news/news-oct28-2008.
html> [Pratten Statement of Claim].

9

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11.
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that is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic
society.
Importantly, this paper is limited in its scope in several
respects. We do not address the argument that section 7 of the
Charter confers upon donor offspring the right to know their
genetic origins. We also restrict our analysis to sperm donors.
Further, this paper is prospective in its focus. The question of
retroactivity, specifically whether donor-conceived offspring
have a right to access the confidential records of their gamete
donors where the donation was made with an expectation that it
would remain anonymous, is not considered. Whether these
gamete donors have a right to privacy under such
circumstances that may compete with and limit the scope of
any rights donor-conceived offspring may enjoy is also outside
the scope of this paper. In the end we conclude that there is a
reasonable likelihood that donor-conceived offspring will
demonstrate that their section 15 rights have been violated in a
way that cannot be justified under section 1. Regardless of the
outcome of this constitutional case, we believe that provincial
legislatures across Canada must create a registry system for
donor offspring that mirrors provincial adoption registries as
soon as possible.
THE HISTORY OF DONOR ANONYMITY IN CANADA
In Canada, there is no prohibition on the use of anonymous
donated sperm and egg to create one’s family and there is no
law requiring the disclosure of a donor’s identity to the
offspring. The federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act10
(AHRA) protected the anonymity of gamete donors. However,
these provisions are not in force and were declared ultra vires
Parliament following the Supreme Court of Canada’s

10

Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA].
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Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act11 in December
2010. According to the Court, these provisions, together with
several others, were matters that were concerned principally
with health and fell within the legislative authority of the
provinces. Although the Court did not declare these provisions
to be of no force or effect, we believe that they will eventually
be repealed by Parliament. In any event, it is clear that the
regulation of donor anonymity now falls to the provinces.
The decision to allow anonymous gamete donation
under the AHRA was the subject of significant public debate
and disagreement spanning many years. Indeed, the Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Baird
Commission)12 and the Standing Committee on Health13
(Standing
Committee)
presented
starkly
different
recommendations to Parliament on this difficult issue. The
Baird Commission, albeit close to two decades ago, considered
egg14 and sperm15 donation separately, but concluded that both
should remain anonymous.16 The Standing Committee reached
a different conclusion recommending that anonymous donation
end on the basis “that where there is a conflict between the
privacy rights of a donor and the rights of a resulting child to
11

2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3 SCR 457.

12

Canada, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission
on New Reproductive Technologies, (Ottawa: Minister of
Government Services Canada, 1993) [Proceed with Care].

13

Standing Committee on Health, Assisted Human Reproduction:
Building Families (2001), online: Parliament of Canada
<http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/371/heal/reports/rp1
032041/healrp02/healrp02-e.pdf> [Building Families].

14

Proceed with Care, supra note 12 at 587.

15

Proceed with Care, supra note 12 at 445.

16

Proceed with Care, supra note 12 at 479 (Recommendation No 94),
590 (Recommendation No 163).
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know its heritage, the rights of the child should prevail.”17
Ultimately, the AHRA reflected the Baird Commission’s
recommendation that anonymous gamete donation continue.18
Although the provisions of the AHRA are
unconstitutional, it is useful to describe them as they form the
backdrop against which the Pratten litigation evolved and was
argued. It may also represent a possible model for a
provincially-based donor registry. The AHRA protected the
anonymity of donors by prohibiting the disclosure of
identifying information about the donor without his or her
consent.19 The AHRA authorized the disclosure of certain nonidentifying information about the donor to the donor-conceived
offspring either indirectly by the licensee or directly by the
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada (Agency),
which played a key role in the collection, use and disclosure of
information under the AHRA. The AHRA created an elaborate
framework for the collection, use and disclosure of identifying
and non-identifying “health reporting information” of donors,
those undergoing ARTs, and donor-conceived offspring. Many
of the details were to be contained in the regulations. However,
the regulations were notdrafted, and therefore no registry was
in place at the time of the Supreme Court case.20 Nevertheless,
it is possible to make a few general comments about how
identifying and non-identifying information was to be
collected, used and disclosed under these now defunct
provisions.21

17

Building Families, supra note 13 at 21.

18

AHRA, supra note 10 ss 14-18.

19

AHRA, supra note 10 ss 15(4) (licensees), 18(2), 18(3) (Agency).

20

AHRA, supra note 10 s 78.

21

A detailed discussion of these provisions can be found in Vanessa
Gruben, “Assisted Reproduction Without Assisting Over-Collection:
Fair Information Practices and the Assisted Human Reproduction
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Although the physician was required to collect both
identifying and non-identifying information from the donor, the
physician was only authorized to disclose certain nonidentifying information to the recipient of the donated sperm.22
The disclosure of this information was intended to assist the
recipient in selecting a donor and would likely have included
the donor’s personal characteristics such as height, weight, eye
colour, education, as well as the donor’s medical history.23 This
non-identifying information could well have been provided to
the donor-conceived offspring by the social parent.
The Agency was also authorized to disclose certain
non-identifying information directly to the offspring. The
AHRA charged the Agency with creating a health information
registry composed of identifying and non-identifying
information of gamete donors, those who had undergone
assisted human reproduction procedures and those who were
conceived using ARTs.24 The Agency was to indirectly collect

Agency of Canada” (2009) 17 Health LJ 229 [“Assisting OverCollection”].
22

ARHA, supra note 10 at s 15(4). In addition, the AHRA authorizes the
physician to disclose different fragments of the information collected
from donors to a variety of parties for different purposes. See
Vanessa Gruben, “Assisting Over-Collection”, ibid.

23

Health reporting information is defined to include section 3 of the
AHRA. The precise extent of the information to be collected will be
set out in the regulations, which are not yet drafted. However, some
experts have speculated on the extent and scope of this information,
see Health Canada, Workshop on the Licensing and Regulation of
Controlled Activities under the AHR Act and the Obligations of
Licensees Regarding Health Reporting Information (11 July 2007)
online:
Health
Canada
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/pubs/
reprod/index-eng.php#_1> at 26.

24

AHRA, supra note 10, s 17.
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this information through the physician.25 The Agency could use
and disclose the registry information for a number of
purposes.26 The Agency could disclose certain non-identifying
information about the donor to the donor-conceived offspring.27
The Agency had the authority to advise any two individuals
having reason to believe that one or both were conceived by
means of an ART using human reproductive material whether
they were genetically related and, if so, the nature of the
relationship.28 In addition, the AHRA authorized the Agency to
disclose the identity of a donor to a physician if, in the
Agency's opinion, the disclosure was necessary to address a
risk to the health or safety of a donor-conceived offspring.29
The physician could not, however, disclose the donor’s
identity. Thus, while the physician and the Agency were
required to disclose certain non-identifying information about
the donor, neither would be authorized to disclose the donor’s
identifying information without his consent.
Thus, the collection and disclosure of information
about sperm donors and the resulting offspring now falls to the
provinces. To date, no province has acted. This may be, in part,
because of constitutional challenge by Olivia Pratten, a donorconceived offspring who has brought a lawsuit against the
Attorney General of British Columbia. 30

25

In this sense, the physician acts as an information intermediary for the
Agency.

26

Vanessa Gruben, “Assisting Over-Collection”, supra note 21.

27

AHRA, supra note 10 s 18(3).

28

AHRA, supra note 10 s 18(4).

29

AHRA, supra note 10 s 18(7).

30

Pratten, supra note 8.
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THE PRATTEN LITIGATION
Olivia Pratten is searching for information about her sperm
donor or biological progenitor. In her lawsuit, she alleges that
provincial legislation, or the lack thereof, violates the
constitutional rights of donor-conceived offspring. First,
Pratten argues that she has a free-standing constitutional right
to know her biological origins and that the state must take
legislative action to ensure that she can exercise this right. In
the alternative, Pratten argues that the provincial rules
authorizing the destruction of medical records after six years,
including the medical records of sperm donors, violates her
right to physical and psychological security of the person.31
Pratten alleges that this deprivation is not in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice because it is “arbitrary,
irrational, grossly disproportionate, grossly under-inclusive and
contrary to the duty of the state to reasonably accommodate
persons with disabilities.”32 Pratten’s section 7 claim was not
successful at trial.33
Second, Pratten argues that the Adoption Act violates
section 15 of the Charter because it is underinclusive. British
Columbia’s Adoption Act is different in many respects from the
registry that was to be established pursuant to the AHRA.34 The
Adoption Act establishes a legal mechanism through which

31

Pratten Statement of Claim, supra note 8 at 29.

32

Pratten Statement of Claim, supra note 8 at 30.

33

Pratten, supra note 8 at para 316.

34

Four other provinces have open adoption legislation, although each
has different features: Ontario Access to Records, S.O. 2008, ch.5;
Newfoundland Adoption Act, SNL 1999, c A-2.1; Alberta Adoption
Act, RSA 2000, c C-12; Adoption Information Disclosure
Regulations, YOIC 1985/149 (Enabling Statute: Children's Act, RSY
2002, c. 31).
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adoptees can acquire information about their biological parents.
It does so in three ways: it requires the collection of
information about the medical and social history of the
adoptee’s biological family; provides for the making of
openness agreements which facilitate communication between
the adoptee and the biological family; and, provides adoptees
(adopted after 1996) with the opportunity to learn the identity
of their biological parents (either through their original birth
registrations or adoption orders). For those adopted before
1996, identifying information may only be disclosed with the
consent of both the adoptee and the birth parent(s). An adoptee
over the age of 19 and an adult relative of an adoptee over the
age of 19 may register to exchange identifying information.
Only where both have registered may identifying information
about the other be disclosed. Notably, the Adoption Act permits
either the adoptee or the biological parent(s), regardless of
whether the adoption occurred before or after 1996, to file a no
contact declaration which precludes contact between them. The
adoption registry is restricted to adoptees and birth parents. It
does not extend to gamete donors and donor-conceived
offspring.
At trial, Ms. Pratten’s claim under section 15 of the
Charter succeeded.35 The British Columbia Supreme Court
agreed that the Adoption Act violates section 15 because it fails
to include donor-conceived offspring. As is discussed in greater
depth below, Justice Adair concluded that because of the
similarities between adoptees and donor-conceived offspring,
the omission of donor offspring from the Adoption Act created
a disadvantage to and perpetuated stereotypes about donorconceived offspring which resulted in discrimination. Justice
Adair concluded that this violation of section 15 was not
justifiable under section 1 of the Charter.36
35

Pratten, supra note 8 at para 268.

36

Pratten, supra note 8 at para 325.
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The Attorney General of British Columbia appealed
the Court’s decision on section 15 of the Charter to the British
Columbia Court of Appeal. Ms. Pratten cross-appealed the
Court’s decision on section 7 of the Charter. The Court of
Appeal heard the appeal in February, 2012. To date, the Court
of Appeal has not yet released a decision.
SECTION 15: THE EQUALITY PROVISION
This case provided one of the first opportunities for a judge to
consider the proper approach to section 15 after the Supreme
Court of Canada’s refashioning of its test in the Kapp37 and
Withler38 decisions.
A Brief Overview of Section 15
Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into
force in 1985. The current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Canada, Chief Justice McLachlin, has described it as the
most difficult right and section 15 has endured many efforts to
interpret its meaning. For a decade (from 1999-2008), the
prevailing approach in assessing whether government
legislation or action violated section 15 was rooted in a threepart test developed by the Supreme Court in Law v. Canada.39
In short, the Law test made three broad inquiries, asking: (1) if
the impugned law (i) drew a formal distinction between the
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal
characteristics, or (ii) failed to take into account the claimant’s
already disadvantaged position within Canadian society

37

R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp].

38

Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR
396 [Withler].

39

Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1
SCR 497, 170 DLR (4th) 1.
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resulting in substantively differential treatment between the
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal
characteristics; (2) if the claimant was subject to differential
treatment based on one or more enumerated or analogous
ground; and (3) whether the differential treatment
discriminated, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a
benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal
characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of
perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less
capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or
as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of
concern, respect, and consideration. The Law test proved
difficult to apply and was the target of much critique from
academics, activists and lawyers who found it unpredictable,
unfair and counter-productive to the cause of promoting
constitutional equality values.40 The most troubling aspect of
the Law test was its focus on harms to human dignity as the
essence of equality violations.
In 2008, the Supreme Court refashioned the Law test,
while purporting to return to the principles set out in its first
section 15 case, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.41
In Kapp, the Court emphasized that section 15 is “aimed at
preventing discriminatory distinctions that impact adversely on
members of groups identified by the grounds enumerated in
section 15 and analogous grounds.”42 A judge must consider
these two questions in assessing whether the equality provision
in the Charter has been breached: (1) Does the law create a

40

In Kapp, supra note 37, the Court included two footnotes outlining
the various sources of academic critique of the Law test.

41

Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56
DLR (4th) 1.

42

Kapp, supra note 37 at 16.
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distinction based on an enumerated or analogous
ground? (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? In returning to its
Andrews foundations, the Court distanced itself from the focus
on human dignity that had confounded cases after Law.
More recently, the Supreme Court tackled another
persistent problem in section 15 cases: the choice of the proper
comparator group. In Withler, the Court revisited the
appropriate role comparison should play in equality analysis
and deemphasized the need to choose a single, “correct”
comparator group. In the first step of the Kapp analysis,
comparison helps to establish the distinction in treatment. At
this stage it is unnecessary to find a particular group that
“precisely corresponds to the claimant group.”43 At the second
step, the Court noted that “[c]omparison may bolster the
contextual understanding of the claimant’s place within a
legislative scheme and society at large, and thus help to
determine whether the impugned law or decision perpetuates
disadvantage or stereotyping.”44
Justice Adair relied on both Kapp and Withler in her
section 15 analysis in the Pratten decision. Her reasons are
fairly short and she had little to go on in terms of examples of
how to apply the Supreme Court’s new direction. In our view,
many of her conclusions are rooted in language and an
approach that more properly follows the Law decision. In
particular, the language she uses to support Ms. Pratten’s claim
focuses on a dignity-style analysis. The Pratten case may have
been more successfully framed under Law then under the
Supreme Court’s new direction in Kapp and Withler. This is
ironic given an effort by section 15 scholars to encourage a

43

Withler, supra note 38 at para 63.

44

Ibid at para 65.
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move away from Law, because of its tendency to result in
denied claims.
The First Challenge: Comparative Analysis
Justice Adair compared the claimant’s group of donor offspring
to adopted children. The claim was argued as one of
underinclusivity, with Ms. Pratten seeking inclusion in the
legislative scheme that gives adopted children access to
information about their birth parents. Ontario courts have
rejected arguments in a similar vein brought by adopted
children comparing themselves to the biologically born and
raised.45 There is no constitutional right for adopted children to
know the identity of their birth parents. Courts held that
Ontario was not constitutionally required to ensure that adopted
children had access to the identity of their birth parents.46
There are obvious parallels between adopted children
and donor offspring. Individuals belonging to either group
may not know the identity of one, or both, of their genetic
progenitors. As discussed above, the practices of gamete
donation and adoption have long histories of secrecy and
anonymity. Adopted children claim a “right to know” their
genetic histories because that knowledge plays a key role in the
positive development of their self-identity.47 On this basis,
arguments surrounding the best interests of the child prompted
legislative reforms that favoured disclosure over anonymity.48

45

Ontario v Marchand (2006), 81 OR (3d) 172 ,142 CRR (2d) 25 (Ont
Sup Ct), aff’d 2007 ONCA 787, 288 DLR (4th) 762 [Marchand cited
to OR].

46

Cheskes v Ontario (Attorney General) (2007), 87 OR (3d) 581, 159
CRR (2d) 191 [Cheskes]

47

Turkmendag, supra note 1 at 289.

48

Adoption Information Disclosure Act, 2005, SO 2005, c 25.
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It can be argued that the same concerns that prompted these
reforms are also present for donor-conceived offspring. They
too feel a need to know their genetic heritage. Some argue that
denying donor-conceived offspring access to the same type of
regime available to adopted children is demeaning to their
sense of self-worth. Differential treatment might suggest to
donor-conceived offspring that their curiosity or need to know
their biological heritage is less understandable, or less
significant than the feelings and self-perception of adopted
children. Justice Adair accepted the parallels and concluded
that donor offspring are subject to differential treatment.
In our view, this conclusion was based on a superficial
appreciation of the alleged harm. To be fair, Justice Adair is
clear in her findings of fact that many of the claimants
arguments were uncontested by the government.49 We posit
that despite the apparent similarities, there are differences
between the process of adoption and the practice of gamete
donation that may explain why adopted children are currently
treated differently with respect to accessing the identity of their
biological parents that the court should have addressed. In the
context of adoption, both parents are social parents, whereas a
donor offspring is often the biological child of one of his
parents.50 The adopted child was relinquished by his or her
biological parents as opposed to a donor offspring who was, in
essence, created by his or her social parents. Some argue that
this is a critical distinction for adopted children who may face
unique psychological struggles in feeling that they were “given
away” at birth and may not know either of their biological

49

Pratten, supra note 8 at 230, 232.

50

However, there are an increasing number of people who are using
donated embryos to create their families. See for example the embryo
donation program operated through Beginnings, online: Beginnings
Family Services <http://www.beginnings.ca/>.
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parents. This perception could justify the distinction in
treatment.51
However, while it is true that donor offspring do not
have to deal with the same form of rejection confronted by
adopted children, this position assumes that the “need”
expressed by adopted children to understand their genetic
history is fuelled by feelings of rejection, rather than an innate
desire to know their genetic make-up. This is arguably not the
case. Some adopted children and donor offspring simply
express desires to know which family member they look like,
or whose mannerisms they have. This implies that adopted
children feel an urge to connect with their genetic origins and
are not just looking for answers about why they were given up
for adoption.
Others have tried to distinguish adopted children from
donor-conceived offspring on the basis that a donor-conceived
child integrates with the gestational mother during pregnancy
and has the potential of experiencing breast-feeding.52 These
arguments explain why a donor-conceived child may, or may
not, bond faster with his or her mother as compared to an
adopted child. Whether this is the case or not, the gestational
experience does not necessarily take away from the desire the
offspring has to ascertain the identity of his or her genetic
father. It is not the case that the more a child bonds with one
parent, the less they may want to know about the other.
There is arguably a significant difference between a
biological mother relinquishing a child for adoption after a
pregnancy and childbirth and a man donating sperm. Aside
51

Pasquale Patrizio et al, “Disclosure to Children Conceived with
Donor Gametes Should be Optional” (2001) 16 Human Reproduction
2036.

52

Ibid.
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from the obvious differences in physical burdens between the
two experiences, presumably most children who are
relinquished for adoption were not conceived expressly for that
purpose. Gamete donors on the other hand, whether sperm or
egg donors, give up their genetic material in full appreciation
that it will be used in in vitro or artificial insemination practices
and may result in conception. Sperm donors in particular can
become biological “parents” of multiple children arising from
one donation.53 The position of women who give up a child for
adoption and gamete donors is distinct in a way that makes
those two groups incomparable. The children arising from
those two groups however may have similar experiences and
concerns about their genetic histories or a need to actually meet
a biological parent.
The question is really whether adopted children are
distinct from donor-conceived offspring in such a way that
warrants this differential treatment. If so, the distinction will
not be considered discriminatory within the meaning of section
15. The legislature implemented a pro-disclosure policy in
order to address the negative ramifications experienced by

53

As a result, many states impose limits on the number of offspring per
gamete donor: PM Janssens et al, “Reconsidering the Number of
Offspring Per Gamete Donor in the Dutch Open-Identity System”
(2011) 14 Human Fertility 106; N Sawyer, “Sperm Donor Limits that
Control for the 'Relative' Risk Associated with the Use of OpenIdentity Donors” (2010) 25 Human Reproduction 1089. The potential
number of donor offspring arising from a single donor may have
significant pragmatic consequences for any attempt to legislate
information disclosure. Sperm donors may be far more reluctant to
register identifying or contact information, given that dozens of
potential offspring may come forward. The emotional reward of
reconnecting with a single child given up for adoption seems
manifestly different from the emotional minefield of discovering
dozens of children. Sperm donors do not even know for certain that
their donation ever produces a child.
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adopted children who did not know the identity of their
biological parents. It is arguable that donor-conceived offspring
also suffer these same negative consequences when denied
access to their genetic heritage. If the similarities between
donor-conceived offspring and adopted children can be
successfully established and the differences adequately
addressed, we believe the section 15 claim will be
strengthened.
The Kapp Test
Step One: The Ground of Discrimination
After establishing differential treatment, a claimant must
demonstrate that he or she belongs to a group that can be
described in reference to one of the grounds of discrimination
enumerated in section 15 or analogous thereto. Neither
adoption nor gamete donation are listed are enumerated in
section 15. In her class action suit, Olivia Pratten argued that
she faces discriminatory treatment by virtue of the fact that she
was conceived by gamete donation rather than by sexual
intercourse. Her “mode of conception” is the location of her
discrimination, “because of physical disability, sexual
orientation, family status or is otherwise analogous to the
grounds enumerated in that section.”54 This is a claim based on
a relationship of association. It alleges that a child conceived
by gamete donation suffers discrimination on the basis of a
ground occupied by her legal parents. As a partner in a samesex relationship, or a woman with a disability unable to
conceive or bear a biological child, or a single person wishing
to raise a child, her parent occupied a ground that is either
enumerated in section 15 or analogous thereto. The child
herself is not a member of either an enumerated or analogous
ground. Based on equality jurisprudence to date, it is unlikely a
54
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section 15 claim can proceed on the basis of being related to, or
impacted by (but not directly a member of) an enumerated or
analogous ground. Certainly we can think of no examples
where such a claim was successful.
Justice Adair accepted the analogous ground of “mode
of conception”. The criteria for describing an analogous ground
were laid out in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and
Northern Affairs).55 The Supreme Court of Canada held that,
“the thrust of identification of analogous grounds . . . is to
reveal grounds based on characteristics that we cannot change
or that the government has no legitimate interest in expecting
us to change to receive equal treatment under the law.”56 The
focus should be on those personal characteristics that are
immutable or constructively immutable. There is no doubt that
a child conceived by gamete donation cannot change his or her
status. One’s mode of conception is an immutable
characteristic. It was solely on this basis that Justice Adair
accepted the claimant’s argument that “mode of conception” is
an analogous ground. However, in Corbiere, the Court argued
that analogous grounds should be like those enumerated in that
they should be grounds that have often served as a basis for
stereotypical decision-making. Members of the analogous
ground might be associated with a discrete and insular minority
or a group that has been historically discriminated against.
Certainly donor-conceived offspring are unable to change their
status, but it is less clear whether one’s mode of conception
leads to stereotypical decision-making on the part of
governments, or historical patterns of discrimination. We do
not think there is sufficient evidence of either to find that one’s
“mode of conception” is an analogous ground under section 15.

55

Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999]
2 SCR 203, 173 DLR (4th) 1 [Corbiere cited to SCR].
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One other option is to argue based on “family status”.
There have been only a handful of cases launched by adopted
children challenging anonymity provisions in provincial
legislation governing adoption records. These cases have not
engaged in a fulsome analysis of the issue and are inconclusive
on whether adoption is an analogous ground.57 So for example,
in Pringle v. Alberta (Human Rights, Multiculturalism and
Citizenship Commission), McIntyre J. concluded with little
explanation that the legislation governing the release of birth
registrations drew a distinction between adult non-adopted
children and adult adopted children, on the enumerated ground
of “family status”, defined as “the status of being related to
another person by blood, marriage or adoption.”58 Similarly, in
Marchand v. Ontario, Frank J. accepted, without finding, that
family status was an analogous ground, and ultimately
concluded that the impugned provisions of the adoption law did
not violate section 15 of the Charter.59 Adoption, however,
would be an argument based on “family status” and not mode
of conception (as adopted children would presumably be
conceived primarily by sexual intercourse). The Supreme Court
of Canada has not definitely ruled on whether ‘family status’ is
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In Pringle v Alberta (Human Rights, Multiculturalism and
Citizenship Commission), 2004 ABQB 821, 246 DLR (4th) 502,
McIntyre J. stated (at para 48) that the legislation governing the
release of birth registrations drew a distinction “between adult nonadoptees and adult adoptees, including Pringle, differential treatment
on the enumerated ground of ‘family status’, defined as ‘the status of
being related to another person by blood, marriage or adoption.’” In
Marchand, supra note 45, Frank J. reached only a provisional
determination on the issue of the ground (at 139): “The Attorney
General takes no position as to whether adoption is an analogous
ground. For the purposes of this application, I accept that it is an
analogous ground, but make no finding.”
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an analogous ground under section 15.60 Justice Adair did not
address this question. We think this is a more promising avenue
moving forward as it is likely claimants can adduce evidence
that “family status” has been the origin of historic prejudice
and stereotyping. Those kinds of arguments are more difficult
with “mode of conception” given that there has been little time
to accumulate a pattern of exclusion or discriminatory thinking.

60

See Thibaudeau v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 627, 124 DLR (4th) 449,
per McLachlin J (separated or divorced custodial parenthood an
analogous ground) and Schafer v Canada (Attorney General) (1997),
35 OR (3d) 1, 149 DLR (4th) 704 (Ont CA), leave to appeal to SCC
refused, [1998] 1 SCR xiv [Schafer cited to OR] (whether adoptive
parent status is an analogous ground). The Ontario Court of Appeal
reasoned (at paras 50-53): “[I]t is not immediately apparent to me
that the position of adoptive mothers constitutes an analogous ground.
Women who have adopted one or more children are a relatively small
minority of the population, but that minority is not discrete in the
sense of separate or discernible, nor is it insular in the sense of
isolated or self-contained. They are simply mothers and, as such, are
indistinguishable from other mothers. I also have difficulty with
Cameron J.'s statement that "adoptive parents have suffered historical
and legal disadvantages as a result of their status as adoptive parents."
The material filed, and in particular the affidavit of Charlene
Elizabeth Miall, provides some foundation for a finding that social
mythology regards blood ties as somehow "better", and infertility as a
sign of "inadequacy". There can be no doubt, as well, that adopted
children have suffered legal disadvantage, but the advantages denied
adoptive parents, save for the Act itself, are neither impressive nor
persuasive. I am not persuaded that women who adopt do so
necessarily because of a personal characteristic that is immutable, or
changeable only at unacceptable personal cost. Not all women who
adopt do so for reasons of infertility or the medical risks associated
with pregnancy. However, despite my reservations, I am prepared to
assume, without deciding, that the position of adoptive mothers does
in fact constitute an analogous ground in this situation.”
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Step Two: The Discrimination Analysis
Assuming that a donor-conceived offspring could succeed at
the first phase of the Kapp section 15 analysis, there remains
the challenge of establishing that the government is treating
this group in a way that perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping
or creates disadvantage. Justice Adair agreed with the
claimants that donor offspring have been historically
disadvantaged.61 She concluded that donor offspring are
stereotyped as not needing donor information because they
have one genetic parent. She accepted that “[d]onor offspring
can carry the burden of stigma that comes of feeling that they
are perceived as biological products.”62 As an example, she
relied on the testimony of one witness, who confessed that he
thinks of himself as “one of his lab experiments.”63 In our view
however, the extrapolation of his private misgivings to the
level of a stereotype or stigma impacting the entire group,
seriously misrepresents the role that stereotyping and stigma
play in discrimination analysis. Individual donor offspring may
feel some psychological stress or embarrassment at their status,
but this is not a widely-perceived association. In Marchand, the
court refused to see a pattern of discrimination in disclosure
regimes with respect to adopted children. Frank J. concluded
that there “is no credible evidence that shows this legislation
promotes stereotypes or demeaning messages about adopted
persons. The scheme does not make stereotypical assumptions
about the applicant or adopted persons generally. It is not based
on any misconception whereby adopted persons are unfairly
portrayed as having undesirable traits, or traits that they do not
possess.”64
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In Schafer, the court made an obiter comment that
adopted children have suffered “legal disadvantage.”65 This
observation was unsupported by any further explanation and
offered in the context of a discussion that disputed whether
adoptive mothers constituted an analogous ground. In Schafer,
the court assumed without deciding that adoptive mothers
could fit as an analogous ground, but seemed lukewarm to the
idea. Whether their children have suffered from discrimination
and prejudice would be relevant in the analysis. In Pringle, the
Court relied on the dignity analysis in Law, and concluded that
“knowledge of a person's past is undoubtedly integral to that
person's emotional and physical well-being, and legislation
impeding an adult adoptee's access to knowledge of his or her
past demeans that adult adoptee's psychological and physical
integrity or dignity.”66 While on its face, this reasoning is
supportive of information disclosure, it is a problematic
conclusion for the Pratten case in two respects. First, the Court
in Pringle gave too much weight to the notion that any
distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground is
prima facie discriminatory.67 This is a formalistic and not
substantive approach to section 15 and not one that is endorsed
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Second, the Court relies
entirely on concerns about the psychological impact of
anonymous donation. The Court’s new line of thinking on
section 15 after Kapp has moved away from concerns with
human dignity. It is also evident that the greatest psychological
harm could not be prevented by information disclosure
regimes. Even in the adoption context, children are not allowed
to independently seek parental information until they turn 18.
In the donor-conceived offspring context, the feelings of being
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a “lab experiment” presumably arise as soon as the reality of
the child’s conception is understood.
Children conceived by artificial reproduction are a
relatively new phenomenon and the practice is still not
widespread. While there are some parents who have publicly
expressed concerns about the discrimination their donorconceived children may face, it is difficult to describe the
location of that mistreatment. Certainly, there is no legislation
that makes any facial distinction amongst benefits or
entitlements given to children as a class. The location of any
discrimination could only be in terms of regimes of disclosure
that differ in the provinces between adopted children and
donor-conceived offspring. Courts should be reluctant to see a
“history” of discrimination and prejudice arising from the very
scheme attacked in a claim. The claimants suffer from the
problem of having their discrimination defined only by the
regime they challenge.
Justice Adair’s reasoning on the discrimination step
would likely face more success if it could be framed as a
dignity violation under the old Law decision. Her reliance on
the evidence of Mr. Adams68 suggests that she was moved by
the individual experiences of the witnesses she heard. Her
conclusions on stereotype however, do not seem borne out by
the evidence as discriminatory or prejudicial. For example, she
argues, “[t]he more sinister stereotype is that donor offspring
are, in a sense, manufactured, and either they lack normal
human needs, or if they have needs, it is acceptable to ignore
them.”69 Her judgment cites little objective evidence to support
this conclusion, other than the arguments of some of the
68
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claimants who testified as to their personal feelings of a loss of
dignity. In Marchand, the Court came to a similar conclusion,
as “the denial of the information that is the basis of the
applicant's challenge is not the denial of a benefit conferred by
law nor is it the imposition of a burden the law does not impose
on others. The information the applicant seeks is available to
non-adopted persons, not as a result of legislation, but through
their personal circumstances. The applicant has not referred the
court to any law to support her position to the contrary.”70 This
is the most striking weakness in the Pratten case as well.
While there may be psychological harm flowing from the
absence of information, that blank slate does not result in any
lived experience of prejudice, nor are donor-conceived
offspring in any way differentiated by the government in a
stereotypical way. To be successful under the Kapp framework,
Pratten needs to adduce evidence of discrimination based on
prejudice and stereotype, and shift her focus from the dignity
harms she and other witnesses brought forward at trial. This
will be a difficult move.
In our view, there are a number of challenges on appeal
in the Pratten case. There are many obstacles to a successful
section 15 claim, ranging from defining the analogous ground,
the tenuous comparison between donor offspring and adopted
children, and the establishment of discrimination. The lack of
success in equality challenges by adopted children is indicative
of the court’s reluctance to see a pattern of harmful
stereotyping or prejudicial treatment. To succeed, a more
fulsome analysis of the comparison between donor offspring
and adopted children is warranted. Further, greater
consideration of the ground of discrimination, “mode of
conception” as opposed to “family status”, is necessary.
Finally, evidence that the government is treating donor
offspring in a way that perpetuates prejudice, stereotyping or
70
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disadvantage, as described above, will be required to discharge
the burden established in Kapp.
SECTION 1: IS THE VIOLATION JUSTIFIABLE?
Assuming the claimants are successful in a section 15 claim to
the impugned provisions, the question remains whether the
government can justify the violation at the section 1 stage of
the case under R v Oakes.
A Pressing and Substantial Objective
The government would have to convince the Court that the
exclusion of donor conceived offspring from the Adoption Act
served an important governmental interest, and that the
provisions were integral to the legislative objective as a whole.
The purpose of the Adoption Act set out in section 2 is to
“provide for new and permanent family ties through adoption,
giving paramount consideration in every respect to the child’s
best interest.” Although the Adoption Act touches on many
aspects of adoption, several sections of the Adoption Act
promote openness by establishing an information registry for
adoptees and biological parents. The government could argue
that it is reasonable to limit the adoption information registry to
adoptees and to exclude donor conceived offspring for at least
two reasons. Both arise from the unique concerns relating to
the use of donated gametes.
First, the government may argue that, unlike adoption,
a regime requiring the collection, use and disclosure of donor
information must ensure an adequate supply of donated sperm
and egg to meet the reproductive needs of Canadians. As such,
an information registry requiring the disclosure of identifying
information should be limited to adoptees. Concerns about
supply are frequently invoked as the principal reason for
protecting donor anonymity and creating an information
registry for donor-conceived offspring that only requires the
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disclosure of non-identifying information about donors. To
preserve the choice of individuals to use donated gametes to
create their families, the government could argue that a
plentiful source of donor gametes is required to protect the
integrity of the system and to maintain genetic diversity within
the recipient pool.
Many fear a marked decline in donated sperm in the
wake of abolishing donor anonymity.71 Donors may feel that it
is in their best interests to remain anonymous in order to avoid
the pitfalls of responsibility or obligation (legal or moral) that
might attend a process which revealed their identities. Indeed,
some have argued that the majority of donors only donate
because they can remain anonymous and avoid all ties with the
children produced by their donation. The only national survey
conducted on the motivation of sperm donors in Canada
indicated that maintaining anonymity was the “number one
condition for sperm donation.”72 In Canada, concerns about
supply are compounded by the current prohibition on payment
for gametes, which has resulted in heavy reliance on sperm
imported from the United States; indeed there are currently
only 39 sperm donors in Canada.73 A prohibition on payment
for gametes combined with a requirement for the donor to
disclose certain information, which is discussed below, could
aggravate a supply shortage.
Less is known about egg donation, the importance of
anonymity for egg donors, and the potential impact on supply
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should anonymity be abolished. However, it is likely that
similar concerns exist in respect of egg donation.
Second, the government could argue that, unlike in
adoption, it is in the best interests of donor-conceived offspring
and their families to preserve the anonymity of one’s biological
progenitor. The state has historically favoured gamete donor
anonymity for a number of reasons. The considerable legal
uncertainty about the parental status of donors in many
provinces, unlike in adoption where the legal status of the
biological parent is severed, may continue to justify preserving
donor anonymity. As such, the government may argue that it is
in the best interests of donor-conceived offspring and families
to exclude offspring from a registry which requires the
disclosure of identifying information about one’s biological
progenitor.
The government has long taken the position that donor
anonymity is in the best interests of the family. Indeed, this
position was maintained in the now defunct provisions of the
AHRA described above. Historically, there was a concern that
the use of ARTs and donor sperm threatened to undermine the
family unit because of the stigma associated with infertility and
illegitimacy.74 Some heterosexual parents worried that the
offspring would reject the social father because there is no
genetic bond between them.75 As a result, the use of these
technologies was, and for some continues to be, shrouded in
secrecy. Donor anonymity and the secrecy it enabled allowed
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75
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parent(s) to choose their preferred family form and promoted
“their ability to form family bonds as they see fit.”76
The state has also argued that donor anonymity is in
the best interests of the donor-conceived offspring and the
family because it allows him or her to develop stronger bonds
with the newly formed family unit.77 As the Baird Commission
explained, “knowing the identity of the donor may be seen by
them [the family] to belittle their shared experience, as well as
actual parenthood. If revelation of the donor’s identity is
unwanted but is mandatory, it may well be at the expense of the
well-being of the child and the social parents.”78 The concern is
that the presence of the sperm donor in families would interfere
with the bonding between the child and the legal parent. The
unwanted presence of the donor could disrupt the “privacy and
security” of the newly formed family.79
The government’s concern about excluding the donor
from the family unit persists today because of the uncertain
parental status of sperm and egg donors in many provinces in
Canada. Unlike in adoption, the parental status of the donor is
not explicitly severed by legislation in many provinces, with
the exception of Quebec, Alberta, Newfoundland and
Labrador, and British Columbia.80 As a result, there is a great
76
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deal of ambiguity regarding the rights and responsibilities of
the sperm donor vis-à-vis the donor-conceived offspring
including child support and access.
The concern about the parental status of the donor
affects heterosexual families, however, it is particularly acute
for lesbian-led and single mother families. Women-led families
are uniquely affected by the possibility of the sperm donor
intruding into and disrupting their family life because of the
propensity of courts to insert a “father figure” into these family
units. Indeed this concern is evident in a number of Canadian
cases where the presence of a known donor has been the basis
upon which the court has denied legal parenting rights to a nonbiological lesbian parent or given the donor access rights to the
offspring.81 For example, a Quebec court has excluded the nonbiological lesbian mother by concluding that the biological
lesbian mother and donor were in a “parental project” under
article 538 of the Quebec Civil Code.82 The Quebec Court of
Appeal applied similar reasoning in granting a known sperm
donor parental status despite evidence that the single mother by
choice did not intend from him to be involved as a parent.83 In
Ontario, the court rejected a non-biological lesbian mother’s
application to be recognized as a legal parent because the
known sperm donor, who was actively involved in the child’s
“Women-led families, family law and assisted human reproductive
technologies: families outside of the law” in Jennifer Kilty, ed,
Women and the Law, Canadian Scholar’s Press, [forthcoming in
2012].
81
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life, refused to consent. It will be interesting to see whether the
court reaches a similar conclusion in De Blois v Lavigne, where
a known donor who agreed to give up his parental rights and is
now seeking parental status of the child contrary to the wishes
of his lesbian co-parents.84 In light of these cases, women-led
families may be especially reluctant about removing donor
anonymity. In short, donor anonymity can be seen as protecting
families from the unwanted intrusion of the sperm donor into
their family. Whether the same concerns exist for egg donors
remain to be seen.
In our view, it is likely that the first of the government
objectives (a desire to protect the integrity and supply of the
donor system which could be seriously jeopardized if
anonymity was prohibited) would likely be considered to be
pressing and substantial. Similarly, the second objective,
protecting donor-conceived offspring and the family unit,
would likely also be described as pressing and substantial. To
defeat the government at this stage, the claimant would have to
refute that the government has any interest in encouraging
gamete donation, and that it has no interest in the dynamics of
the families involved in that process. Given that the state’s
interest in protecting the integrity of Canadian families is longstanding85 it is unlikely the Court would deny the government’s
interests here.
The analysis would then turn to the second part of the
section 1 test, proportionality, with its three sub-parts.
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A Rational Relationship
Assuming the Court accepted the two objectives outlined
above, the government would have to establish that there is a
strong connection between excluding donor-conceived
offspring from the adoption registry and its dual goals of
guaranteeing the supply of donor gametes and protecting the
best interests of families created through third party
reproduction. In our view, the government’s argument may
face some challenges at this stage.
With respect to supply, the government would need to
produce some evidence that the supply of egg and/or sperm
would be threatened without guaranteed anonymity. The
government would not have to prove a definitive threat, but
would have to satisfy the Court that it is likely that supply
would diminish, and that a reduced supply would be harmful to
the success of the assisted reproductive process.
The government can only speculate as to whether this
shortage will in fact occur in Canada. The experiences of other
Western countries that have abolished donor anonymity offer
some clues about the potential impact on sperm supply.
Turkmendag et al’s review of the experience in various
countries reveals that the effects of abolishing donor anonymity
are “ambiguous” at best.86 This is, in part, because there are
few studies on the impact on donor supply. Nevertheless, there
appears to be a decline in sperm donation immediately
following the abolition of donor anonymity, as seen in
Sweden;87 the Netherlands;88 Western Australia;89 and, the
86
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United Kingdom,90 among others. However, in many countries,
the initial decrease was followed by a gradual increase. An
increase in supply was observed in Sweden.91 An increase in
the United Kingdom has also been reported by the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, although some have
argued that this has been the result of increases in the
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compensation of gamete donors92 and aggressive marketing
campaigns for gamete donors.93
In Canada, it is difficult to say whether the abolition of
anonymity will result in decreased sperm supply. On the one
hand, the supply problem may be mitigated by the large pool of
sperm donors available in the United States, which are the
primary source of sperm for Canadians. These concerns may
also be mitigated by the prevalence of open-identity or identity
release sperm donors, which are increasingly available to
individuals wishing to use donated gametes to create their
families.94 However, the abolition of donor anonymity together
with a requirement for the donor to include certain information
in a registry may negatively impact the importation of sperm
from the United States to Canada. Indeed, there is some
92
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question as to whether the introduction of registry system
would be coupled with a ban on imported sperm because of the
legal difficulties associated with regulating foreign donors,
which is discussed in greater depth below.
Thus, the impact of abolishing donor anonymity on
gamete supply in Canada is unclear. However, the ambiguity
surrounding the impact on supply may potentially undermine
the state’s argument that a rational connection exists between
maintaining donor anonymity and ensuring an adequate donor
supply.
With respect to the second objective, the government
would need to successfully argue that, unlike adopted families,
recipient families are better off under an anonymous regime,
and that the exclusion of donor-conceived offspring from the
adoption regime is rationally connected to its goal of protecting
families created through the use of donated gametes.
In our view, the connection between donor anonymity
and protecting the integrity of the family unit may also be
questioned. First and foremost, there is some empirical
evidence that indicates that knowing the manner of one’s
conception does not have a negative or detrimental impact on
the offspring or their larger family unit.95 Indeed, these studies
95
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suggest that offspring who learn that they were conceived using
donated sperm, gradually and at a young age, generally suffer
no psychological harm and in most cases appear to be quite
well-adjusted.96 This weakens the state’s historical concern
about preserving donor anonymity in order to promote the best
interests of the child and bonding in the new family unit.
Second, the use of donor gametes is becoming increasingly
common and as it does, the stigma associated with the use of
these technologies continues to fade. Nevertheless, many
parent(s) continue to keep the conception status of the offspring
secret, out of concerns for family integrity, which is enabled by
donor anonymity.
Less clear, however, is the impact of an identityrelease donor on the well being and integrity of the various
members of the family unit. Unfortunately, there are few
studies regarding the psychological impact of knowing the
donor’s identity (which may simply include knowing the name
of the sperm donor or may extend to forming a relationship
with the donor) on the donor-conceived offspring. Some
scholars have speculated that “by providing personal
information about the donor, a perceived emotional link
between the child and donor could be created. This may cause
a significant problem if the majority of sperm donors do not
wish to have contact with recipients or any involvement with

“School-aged Children of Donor Insemination: A Study of Parents’
Disclosure Patterns” (2005) 20 Human Reproduction 810. See also P
Casey, “Child Development and Parent-Child Relationships in
Surrogacy, Egg Donation and Donor Insemination Families at Age 7”
(Paper delivered at the 24th AGM of the Eureopean Society of Human
Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE), Barcelona, Spain, July
2008) cited in ESHRE, Focus on Reproduction, online: ESHRE
<http://www.eshre.eu/binarydata.aspx?type=doc&sessionId=3qtq5c4
50mot2u55s4y01azl/ESHRE_Sep_08.pdf>.
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biological offspring born as a result of their donation.”97 To
date, there is little evidence and only limited speculation about
whether learning the donor’s identity upon the age of majority
has a positive or negative impact on donor-conceived offspring.
However, as mentioned above, there have been a
number of troubling court decisions where known sperm
donors have been awarded access to their offspring both in the
context of lesbian-led and single mother families against the
wishes of the intended parents.98 These decisions illustrate a
tendency on the part of the courts to grant the donor access to
the offspring under the guise that it is in the best interests of the
donor-conceived offspring that he/she has a ‘father figure’. In
our view, there is no question that these decisions undermine
the intention of the legal parents and threaten the integrity of
women-led families.
Arguably, legal mechanisms, other than preserving
donor anonymity, may effectively exclude the sperm donor
from the family unit and thereby weaken the government’s
rational connection argument. The first possibility is to delay
the disclosure of the identifying information to the donor and
offspring until the offspring reaches the age of majority when
custody, access and support are no longer an issue. Notably, the
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adoption registry already does so.99 The second way to protect
the family unit is through provincial legislation that confirms
that the donor does not have parental status and ensures that the
social parents enjoy full parental status.100 However, this type
of legislation, while necessary, will certainly not preclude
litigation of cases concerning the parental status and rights of
known donors in Canadian families.101 In light of the gendered
approach adopted by some courts in this context and the reality
that parentage laws in most provinces do not reflect the
realities of these new family forms, the government may well
be able to demonstrate that a rational connection exists between
donor anonymity and protecting families, especially womenled families.
Minimal Impairment
This step in the section 1 analysis offers the most potential for
claimants, for it is here that the Court often finds that the
government has overstepped. While the government does not
need to show that it considered every other possibility, it must
satisfy the Court that it considered a range of options and chose
a “less harmful means of achieving the legislative goal.”102 If
the claimants succeeded at the section 15 stage, it would be
because they convinced the Court that they are sufficiently like
adopted children to warrant some legislative regime that
entitles them to know the identity of a biological parent. As we

99
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have noted, courts have been reluctant to constitutionalize a
“right to know” for adopted children.103 This group has access
to identifying information because of a proactive legislative
initiative and not because governments are constitutionally
compelled to divulge the identity of biological parents.
However, should donor-conceived offspring succeed in arguing
that the information regime for adoptees should be extended to
cover their circumstances, it is unlikely the government could
successfully argue that the absence of any legislation
governing the collection and disclosure of identifying and nonidentifying information from donors to offspring is a minimally
impairing process.
As discussed above, there is currently no provincial or
federal law requiring the collection of information from gamete
donors and the disclosure of any information, identifying or
not, to the offspring. The AHRA established a regime that
protected the anonymity of the donor yet ensured that the
offspring received relevant non-identifying information about
the donor and, in certain circumstances, his or her half-siblings.
As these provisions are now defunct, and the provincial
governments have not filled this legislative gap, it is unlikely
that the government would succeed in arguing that its exclusion
of donor conceived offspring from the adoption registry is
minimally impairing.
What if a province enacted a registry akin to the now
defunct federal regime? Would this satisfy the minimal
impairment criteria? An information registry like the one
described in the AHRA addressed many of the health concerns
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shared by adoptees and donor offspring.104 The offspring, like
the adoptee, would receive a family medical history about his
or her biological progenitor. Further, the offspring, like the
adoptee, would receive certain psychosocial information about
his or her biological progenitor, like the donor’s phenotype,
education and interests, to name but a few. The registry could
also include a mechanism whereby donor offspring could
determine whether a prospective intimate partner was a half
sibling. Each of these features of the registry would ensure that
donor offspring received much of the same type of information
about their donors as adoptees do. The only difference
remaining would be the absence of the donor’s identity and
contact information. Notably, this type of registry is
prospective and would not have applied retroactively.105
It is difficult to say whether a registry that includes nonidentifying information only would satisfy the minimally
impairing standard. Notably, Justice Adair, in the context of
her section 7 analysis made the following factual findings
regarding the physical and psychological harm that donor
offspring who have no information, either identifying or nonidentifying, may experience:
(a) some donor offspring do not have access to
what might be important background medical
information that would assist in early
identification of illness or disease and in
treatment, and do not have access to this
information even in circumstances of medical
necessity;
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(b) some donor offspring do not have access to
a biological parent’s medical history, and as a
result are impaired in identifying or treating
genetic conditions;
(c) without further biological testing, some
donor offspring do not have the information
required to determine if another individual is a
biological half-sibling, and are therefore at risk
for inadvertent consanguinity;
(d) some donor offspring do not have access to
important information about their paternal
heritage, culture, religion and other elements
that are important to the formation of their
identity, and which can be responsible for
psychological distress.106
There is no mention of identity per se in these harms.
Thus, it appears that each of these harms can be addressed by
providing the offspring with non-identifying information about
their health, heritage, culture and religion and that disclosure of
the donor’s identity is not required.107 Notably, this type of
non-identifying information is almost always available now to
donor offspring in the form of a donor profile that is put
together by the sperm bank or broker.108 In our view, the
success of the argument regarding identifying information
would depend on whether courts accept that there is a real
difference on the feelings and needs of the children impacted
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by adoption and assisted reproduction processes. However,
donor offspring could argue that a no-disclosure veto or the
possibility of a no-contact order would both be less intrusive on
equality rights than a complete ban on identifying
information.109
Indeed, there is some question about whether
abolishing donor anonymity and introducing a registry whereby
identifying information about the donor would be disclosed to
the offspring when he or she reaches a certain age would
effectively address the harms allegedly arising from not
knowing the identity of one’s biological progenitor. That is
because unless an offspring is aware that he or she is donorconceived, he or she will not know that he or she can access
information from the registry, or request the identity of the
donor where an identity-release donor has been used.
Donor anonymity facilitates secrecy about the fact that
a child is donor-conceived, which has been prevalent in
heterosexual families.110 Historically, the majority of
heterosexual parents chose to keep the manner of the
offspring’s conception secret.111 However, there has been a
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shift towards greater openness in recent years.112 This shift has
been prompted, in part, by the increasing use of donated sperm
by lesbian couples and single women, who because of their
biology have disclosed the manner of conception to their
offspring.113 It has also resulted from the greater availability of
identity-release donors and the prohibition on donor anonymity
in several jurisdictions.114 The abolition of donor anonymity
may result in great openness because parents fear that the
offspring will eventually learn about the manner of their
conception. However, the extent to which the prohibition on
donor anonymity has or will eliminate secrecy about the
offspring’s conception status is debatable. Indeed, Jadva has
speculated that “[i]t is possible that knowing that the child will
be able to contact and meet their donor may actually make
parents less likely to disclose.”115 As a result, it is far from
certain that abolishing donor anonymity and creating an
information registry will address the harms suffered by some
donor offspring.
If the information registry is insufficient, what steps
could the state undertake to address these harms? The only way
to ensure that the donor offspring is aware of the manner of
their conception and thus has an opportunity to access relevant
information about the donor, would be for the state to introduce
a mechanism, such as an annotation on a birth certificate,
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notifying the offspring that they are conceived using donated
gametes. The annotation of the birth certificate has been
considered but not implemented in other jurisdictions like the
United Kingdom and New Zealand.116 Although a detailed
examination is beyond the scope of this article, it is likely that
such an approach would meet with considerable resistance
from parents as well as from society at large. First, it is likely
that many parents will argue that mandating disclosure will
interfere with parental choice. For example, in one empirical
study on disclosure of conception status, parents regardless of
their own decision to disclose or not, “consistently expressed
the opinion that disclosure decisions are private, are highly
personal, and should be left to the discretion of the individual
families and not be regulated in any way.”117 Further, it could
be argued that mandating the disclosure of the use of donated
gametes places a far more onerous burden on parents who use
donated gametes than other families. It is trite that there are
many instances of mistaken paternity; that is, where a man
erroneously believes that he is the genetic father of his children
when in fact he is not.118 Despite the prevalence of this
situation, there is neither a legal obligation on women nor any
state mechanism to disclose this information to their
children.119 Thus, we question whether such an approach, while
potentially effective, would be over reaching.
116
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A final consideration regarding the introduction of a
registry that provides the offspring with access to identifying
information about the sperm donor relates to Canada’s heavy
reliance on imported sperm from the United States. Would it be
possible to legally compel American sperm donors to disclose
contact information and other identifying information for
inclusion into the registry? Although a detailed examination is
beyond the scope of this article, it is possible that Parliament
could require the disclosure of certain identifying information
from the sperm donor as a condition of importing the sperm
into Canada. There are currently several health and safety
requirements which sperm must meet before it can be imported
and used in Canada pursuant to the Processing and
Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations
under the Food and Drugs Act.120 Arguably, information
disclosure could be added to these requirements. Indeed, the
United Kingdom has adopted such an approach. Donated
sperm, eggs and embryos may be imported into the United
Kingdom so long as the donor is identifiable and has provided
the required information disclosure sheet.121 Such a
requirement would, however, only provide the offspring with
information at the time of donation. It would be more difficult,
120

Canada SOR/96-254, s 5. See also Health Canada, Guidance on the
Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception
Regulations (Ottawa: Health Canada, July 2004), online: Health
Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/compli-conform/info-prod/
don/gui_41_tc-tm-eng.php>.

121

UK, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Code of
Practice, 8th ed, online: Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/8th_Code_of_Practice.pdf>
at Guidance Note 16. See also Direction 4 of Compliance Committee
of the HFEA, “Directions given under the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 1990 as amended”, online: Human Fertilization and
Embryology
Authority
<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/2009-0909_General_directions_0006_-_Import_and_export_of_gametes_and
_embryos_-_version_2.pdf> at 1.

292

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 27, 2011]

and perhaps impossible, to require a foreign donor to provide
updated health or contact information. Imposing information
disclosure requirements may negatively impact the supply of
sperm from the United States, where no such requirements
exist, to Canada.
For all the reasons stated above, it is difficult to say
whether a registry of either non-identifying or identifying
donor information and even the abolition of donor anonymity
would effectively address the harms suffered by many donor
offspring. There are several outstanding questions regarding
the extent to which not knowing the identity of the donor is
harmful to the offspring, whether a registry without a
mandatory disclosure requirement would be effective, and the
potential impact of information disclosure requirements.
Further, there are legitimate concerns about the impact of an
information registry on the supply of sperm in Canada.
Nevertheless, we can safely conclude that the legislature’s
failure to take any steps to collect or disclose any information
to offspring, whether non-identifying or identifying, is unlikely
to satisfy the minimally impairing threshold under section 1 of
the Charter.
Proportionality
The proportionality analysis seeks to determine whether “the
overall effects of the law on the claimants [are]
disproportionate to the government’s objective.”122 Although
this stage of the analysis is often not determinative of the
outcome of a case, its importance has recently been
emphasized by the Supreme Court.123 In our view, if the
government demonstrates that the law is minimally impairing,
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which we believe is unlikely, the government will almost
certainly fail at this stage of the section 1 analysis.
When we weigh the benefits and costs of the
challenged law, the balance appears to be skewed in favour of
the costs. The government will likely argue that the salutary
effects of excluding donor offspring from the adoption registry
include ensuring an adequate supply of sperm for the creation
of Canadian families and protecting the integrity of families
that are created through the use of donor sperm. As discussed
above, whether these effects are truly beneficial remains to be
seen. Even if the government establishes that this exclusion
results in real benefits, it will be hard pressed to demonstrate
that these benefits outweigh the deleterious effects of the
legislation.
The exclusion of donor offspring from the adoption
registry, in the absence of any mechanism for obtaining
information, identifying or not, about the sperm donor is of
serious detriment to offspring. Although the evidence about the
extent to which the non-disclosure of identifying information
about one’s sperm donor results in harm to the donor is
uncertain, there is no question that the lack of any medical
information about the donor has a detrimental impact on the
offspring.124 Further, even though there is some question about
the effectiveness of a registry, there is no question that some
offspring who know their conception status would benefit from
such a registry. When weighing the potential benefits of nondisclosure against this harm, it is obvious that the law is
disproportionate.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we believe that there are many laudable reasons
why donor anonymity should be abolished in Canada. Donor
anonymity may lead to physical and psychological harm for
some donor-conceived offspring. Donor-conceived offspring
have a legitimate interest in information regarding their donors.
Many legislatures have recognized the realities of this harm in
adoption and have amended legislation to create adoption
registries that ensure the collection and disclosure of certain
information about adoptees and birth parents and include
appropriate safeguards like disclosure vetos and no contact
clauses to ensure that the interests of all members of the
adoption triad are met. The failure of the legislatures to do so in
the context of ARTs, therefore, appears inconsistent.
The question that remains is whether the best
mechanism to bring about this much-needed reform is a court
concluding that provincial adoption legislation violates section
15 because it is restricted to adoptees and does not extend to
donor offspring. As we have discussed, it is possible that such a
section 15 challenge will succeed. Although Justice Adair’s
analysis in Pratten v. British Columbia (A.G.) falls short in
several respects, it is possible that to address these
shortcomings. In our view, if donor-conceived offspring
successfully establish that their section 15 rights are violated,
the government will be hard pressed to establish that the
violation is reasonable and justified under section 1 of the
Charter.
Regardless of the success or failure of this type of
Charter challenge, we believe that the best way to address
collection, use and disclosure of identifying and nonidentifying information in the context of gamete donation is
through immediate legislative reform. This is so for several
reasons. Legislative reform will almost certainly result in a
quicker response. Regardless of the outcome, it is likely that
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the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision will be
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which will create
further delays. And even if donor offspring are ultimately
successful, the courts will almost certainly suspend any
declaration of invalidity to provide the legislature with time to
enact Charter compliant legislation. Further, legislative reform
will be necessary in those provinces where open adoption
registries do not exist.125 Finally, legislative reform will allow
for proper consultation with all parties involved and will result
in an information regime that is tailored to donor offspring and
addresses the unique concerns that arise in this context.
Accordingly, we believe that as with adoption, legislative
reform is the best option at this time for those seeking greater
openness in sperm donation in Canada.
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